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Abstract. Cauchy’s sum theorem is a prototype of what is to-
day a basic result on the convergence of a series of functions in
undergraduate analysis. We seek to interpret Cauchy’s proof, and
discuss the related epistemological questions involved in comparing
distinct interpretive paradigms. Cauchy’s proof is often interpreted
in the modern framework of a Weierstrassian paradigm. We ana-
lyze Cauchy’s proof closely and show that it finds closer proxies in
a different modern framework.
Keywords: Cauchy’s infinitesimal; sum theorem; quantifier al-
ternation; uniform convergence; foundational paradigms.
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1. Introduction
Infinitesimals were to
disappear from mathematical
practice in the face of
Weierstrass’ ε and δ notation.
[Bottazzini 1986, p. 208]
Nearly two centuries after Cauchy first published his controversial
sum theorem, historians are still arguing over the nature of its hy-
potheses and Cauchy’s modification thereof in a subsequent paper.
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1.1. The sum theorem. In 1821 Cauchy presented the sum theorem
as follows:
When the various terms of series [u0+u1+u2+. . .+un+
un+1 . . .] are functions of the same variable x, continuous
with respect to this variable in the neighborhood of a
particular value for which the series converges, the sum s
of the series is also a continuous function of x in the
neighborhood of this particular value.
This definition is found in his textbook Cours d’Analyse, Theorem I
in section 6.1; the translation above is from [Bradley & Sandifer 2009,
p. 90]. Cauchy returned to the sum theorem in an article [Cauchy 1853],
and the matter has been debated by mathematicians and historians
alike ever since.
Cauchy is often claimed to have modified1 the hypothesis of his sum
theorem in 1853 to a stronger hypothesis of uniform convergence. What
did that modification consist of precisely? Writes G. Arsac:
Assez curieusement, Robinson montre que si l’on in-
terpre`te de fac¸on non standard les hypothe`ses de l’e´nonce´
de Cauchy de 1853 que nous venons d’e´tudier, alors cet
e´nonce´ implique la convergence uniforme. [Arsac 2013,
p. 134]
Our text can be viewed as an extended commentary on Arsac’s rather
curious observation.
The received scholarship on this issue contains a tension between
a pair of contradictory contentions. On the one hand, it holds that
Cauchy worked with an Archimedean continuum (A-track for short)
exclusively; on the other, it holds that Cauchy introduced the condition
of uniform convergence in 1853. These contentions are contradictory
because Cauchy’s 1853 condition was not formulated in an A-track
fashion and on the contrary involved infinitesimals.
In more detail, uniform convergence is traditionally formulated over
an Archimedean continuum in terms of alternating quantifiers which
are conspicuously absent from Cauchy’s text, whereas infinitesimals are
conspicuously present there. From the A-track viewpoint, the modi-
cation required for uniform convergence focuses on how the remainder
term rn(x) behaves both (1) as n increases and (2) as a function of x.
This is, however, not what Cauchy does in his 1853 paper. Namely,
1A debate of long standing concerns the issue of whether Cauchy modified or clari-
fied the hypothesis of the sum theorem of 1853 as compared to 1821. Our analysis of
the 1853 text is independent of this debate and our main conclusions are compatible
with either view.
4 T. B., P. B., A. B., V. K., K. K., M. K., S. K., T. M., D. SC., AND D. SH.
Cauchy declares n to be infinite, and requires rn to be infinitesimal for
all x (toujours).
An infinitesimal-enriched continuum (B-track for short) enables a
characterisation of uniform convergence by means of enlargement of
the domain, along the lines of what Cauchy suggests by means of his
term toujours (always) as widely discussed in the literature; see e.g.,
[Laugwitz 1987], [Cutland et al. 1988]. We argue that Cauchy’s pro-
cedures as developed in his 1853 text admit better proxies in modern
infinitesimal frameworks2 than in modern Weierstrassian frameworks
limited to an Archimedean continuum.
Thus, a B-framework allows us to follow Cauchy in presenting a
statement of the sum theorem without quantifier alternations, and also
to be faithful to Cauchy in retaining his infinitesimals rather than pro-
viding paraphrases for them in terms of either a variable subordinate
to a universal quantifier, or a sequence tending to zero.
1.2. Wartofski’s challenge. Wartofsky launched a challenge to the
historians of science. [Wartofsky 1976] called for a philosophical anal-
ysis of the ontology of a field like mathematics (as practiced during a
particular period) as a prior condition for a historiography that pos-
sesses vision. We propose a minor step in this direction by introducing
a distinction between, on the one hand, the procedures exploited in the
mathematical practice of that period, and, on the other, the ontology
(in the narrow sense) of the mathematical entities like points, num-
bers, or functions, as used during that period. We use Cauchy’s sum
theorem as a case study.
We seek an approach to Cauchy that interprets his sum theorem in a
way faithful to his own procedures. We argue that, leaving aside issues
of the ontology of mathematical entities and their justification in terms
of one or another foundational framework, a B-track (infinitesimal-
enriched) framework provides better proxies for interpreting Cauchy’s
procedures and inferential moves than does an A-track (Archimedean)
framework. More specifically, we will provide a proxy for Cauchy’s
proof of the sum theorem and show that our A-track opponents, who
criticize Cauchy’s proof, have to ignore some of Cauchy’s procedures.
2Some historians are fond of recycling the claim that Abraham Robinson used
model theory to develop his system with infinitesimals. What they tend to overlook
is not merely the fact that an alternative construction of the hyperreals via an
ultrapower requires nothing more than a serious undergraduate course in algebra
(covering the existence of a maximal ideal), but more significantly the distinction
between procedures and foundations (see Section 1.2) which highlights the point
that whether one uses Weierstrass’s foundations or Robinson’s is of little import,
procedurally speaking.
CAUCHY’S INFINITESIMALS AND HIS SUM THEOREM 5
As I. Grattan-Guinness pointed out, Cauchy’s procedures in 1853
are difficult to interpret in an A-framework (see Section 7.1 for more
details). Indeed, nowhere does Cauchy rely on quantifier alternations;
furthermore, he exploits the term always to refer to an extension of
the possible inputs to the function, which must now include infinitesi-
mals in addition to ordinary values. Meanwhile, an A-framework can’t
express uniform convergence without quantifier alternations, nor coun-
tenance any extension beyond the real numbers. We document straw-
manship and crude mathematical errors by A-track scholars in response
to B-track interpretations of Cauchy.
The goal of a Cauchy scholar is not to translate Cauchy’s procedures
into contemporary mathematics so as to obtain a correct result, but
rather to understand them on his (Cauchy’s) own terms, or as close
as possible to his own terms. We argue that Cauchy’s procedures are
best understood in the sense of infinitesimal mathematics, rather than
paraphrased to fit the Epsilontik mode. Recent articles deals with
Cauchy’s foundational stance include [Sørensen 2005], [Ramis 2012],
[Nakane 2014].
1.3. A re-evaluation. This article is part of a re-evaluation of the
history of infinitesimal mathematics. Such studies have recently ap-
peared in journals as varied as Erkenntnis [Katz & Sherry 2013], Foun-
dations of Science [Bascelli et al. 2017], HOPOS [Bascelli et al. 2016],
JGPS [Bair et al. 2017], Notices of the American Mathematical Society
[Bair et al. 2013], Perspectives on Science [Katz, Schaps & Shnider 2013],
Studia Leibnitiana [Sherry & Katz 2014].3 Abraham Robinson’s frame-
work has recently become more visible due to the activity of some
high-profile advocates like Terry Tao; see e.g., Tao [Tao 2014], Tao–Vu
[Tao & Vu 2016]. The field has also had its share of high-profile detrac-
tors like Errett Bishop [Bishop 1977] and Alain Connes [Connes et al. 2001].
Their critiques were analyzed in [Katz & Katz 2011a], [Katz & Leichtnam 2013],
[Kanovei, Katz & Mormann 2013], and [Sanders 2017a], [Sanders 2017b].
Additional criticisms were voiced by J. Earman [Earman 1975], K. Easwaran
[Easwaran 2014], H. M. Edwards [Edwards 2007], G. Ferraro [Ferraro 2004],
J. Grabiner [Grabiner 1981], J. Gray [Gray 2015], P. Halmos [Halmos 1985],
H. Ishiguro [Ishiguro 1990], K. Schubring [Schubring 2005], Y. Sergeyev
[Sergeyev 2015], and D. Spalt [Spalt 2002]. These were dealt with re-
spectively in [Katz & Sherry 2013], [Bascelli et al. 2014], [Kanovei et al. 2015],
[Bair et al. 2017], [Borovik & Katz 2012], [B laszczyk et al. 2017a], [B laszczyk et al. 2016],
[Bascelli et al. 2016], [B laszczyk et al. 2017b], [Gutman et al. 2017], [Katz & Katz 2011b].
3See http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/~katzmik/infinitesimals.html for a more de-
tailed list.
6 T. B., P. B., A. B., V. K., K. K., M. K., S. K., T. M., D. SC., AND D. SH.
2. The revised sum theorem
Cauchy denotes the nth partial sum of the series
s(x) = u0(x) + u1(x) + u2(x) + . . .
by sn(x). He also denotes by rn(x) = s(x)−sn(x) the nth remainder of
the series. Cauchy’s revised sum theorem from [Cauchy 1853, p. 456–
457], as reprinted in [Cauchy 1900], states the following.4
The´ore`me 1. Si les diffe´rents termes de la se´rie
u0, u1, u2, . . . , un, un+1, . . . (1)
sont des fonctions de la variable re´elle x, continues, par
rapport a` cette variable, entre des limites donne´es; si,
d’ailleurs, la somme
un + un+1 + . . . un′−1 (3)
devient toujours infiniment petite pour des valeurs in-
finiment grandes des nombres entiers n et n′ > n, la
se´rie (1) sera convergente et la somme s de la se´rie sera,
entre les limites donne´es, fonction continue de la vari-
able x. [Cauchy 1900, p. 33] (emphasis added)
We will highlight several significant aspects of the procedures exploited
by Cauchy in connection with the sum theorem. Cauchy proceeds to
present the following argument:
Si a` la se´rie (1) on substitue la se´rie (2), l’expression (3),
re´duite a` la somme
sin(n+ 1)x
n+ 1
+
sin(n + 2)x
n + 2
+ . . .+
sinn′ x
n′
(4)
s’e´vanouira pour x = 0; mais pour des valeurs de x tre`s-
voisines de ze´ro, par exemple pour x = 1
n
, n e´tant un
tre`s-grand nombre, elle pourra diffe´rer notablement de
ze´ro; et si, en attribuant a` n une tre`s-grande valeur,
on pose non-seulement x = 1
n
, mais encore n′ = ∞, la
somme (4), ou, ce qui revient au meˆme, le reste rn de la
se´rie (2) se re´duira sensiblement a` l’inte´grale∫
∞
1
sin x
x
dx =
π
2
− 1 +
1
1.2.3
1
3
−
1
1.2.3.4.5
1
5
+ . . . = 0, 6244 . . .
[Cauchy 1853, p. 457]
4Here the equation numbers (1) and (3) are in Cauchy’s text as reprinted in
[Cauchy 1900].
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Cauchy’s use of the substitution “x = 1
n
” is puzzling to a mathemati-
cian trained in the Weierstrassian framework. We will show that Robin-
son’s framework provides a more successful interpretation.
2.1. Infinite numbers. Cauchy considers two instantiations (which
he refers to as valeurs) of integer numbers, denoted n and n′. Note
that he refers to them as infinitely large numbers, rather than either
quantities or sequences increasing without bound.
2.2. Cauchy’s ε. Cauchy points out that in order to prove the sum
theorem, one needs to show that “le module de rn [soit] infe´rieur a` un
nombre ε aussi petit que l’on voudra.” This comment can be formalized
in two different ways, [A] and [B]:
[A] (∀ε ∈ R)(∃m ∈ N)(∀n ∈ N)
[
(ε > 0) ∧ (n > m) =⇒ (|rn| < ε)
]
.
[B] (∀ε ∈ R)
[
(ε > 0)→ (|rn| < ε)
]
.
In neither interpretation does ε assume infinitesimal values.
Here n is a bound variable in formula [A] in the sense of being sub-
ordinate to the universal quantifier. Meanwhile, n is interpreted as
a specific value in [B], i.e., it is a free variable. For formula [B] to
be true, n must be infinite (and rn infinitesimal). Interpretations [A]
and [B] correspond to the two tracks compared in Section 3.4.
Clarifying the formulas completely would require adding a quantifier
over the variable x of rn, as well as specifying explicitly in [B] that n
is infinite.
2.3. When is n′ =∞? Cauchy examines the series5
sin x+
1
2
sin 2x+
1
3
sin 3x+ . . . (2)
closely related to Abel’s purported counterexample to the sum theorem,
namely to the sum theorem as stated in 1821. The series sums to a
(discontinuous) sawtooth waveform. Cauchy argues that the series does
not in fact satisfy the hypotheses of his 1853 theorem, as follows. He
considers the difference sn′−sn = un+un+1+. . .+un′−1 which translates
into the following sum in the case of the series (2):6
sin(n + 1)x
n+ 1
+
sin(n+ 2)x
n + 2
+ . . .+
sin(n′)x
n′
. (4)
Cauchy proceeds to assign the value∞ to the index n′, by writing n′ =
∞, and points out that the sum (4) is then precisely the remainder
term rn.
5The equation number (2) is in Cauchy’s original text.
6The equation number (4) is in Cauchy’s original text.
8 T. B., P. B., A. B., V. K., K. K., M. K., S. K., T. M., D. SC., AND D. SH.
2.4. Evaluating at 1
n
. Cauchy goes on to evaluate the remainder rn(x)
at x = 1
n
and points out in [Cauchy 1853] that the result
se re´duira sensiblement a` l’inte´grale∫
∞
1
sin x
x
dx =
π
2
− 1 +
1
1.2.3
1
3
−
1
1.2.3.4.5
1
5
+ . . . = 0, 6244 . . .
Here one can evalutate the integral of sinx
x
by viewing the series as an
infinite Riemann sum; see [Laugwitz 1989, p. 212]. Cauchy concludes
that the remainder is not infinitesimal and that therefore the purported
counterexample (2) in fact does not satisfy the hypotheses of the sum
theorem as formulated in 1853. For a discussion of Cauchy’s proof of
the theorem see Section 8.4.
3. Methodological issues
3.1. Issues raised by Cauchy’s article. Cauchy’s 1853 article raises
several thorny issues:
(1) If one is to interpret Cauchy’s new hypothesis as uniform con-
vergence, how can one explain the absence of any quantifier
alternations in the article (cf. Section 7.1, claim GG4)?
(2) If the term always is supposed to signal a transition from the
hypothesis of convergence in 1821 to a hypothesis of uniform
convergence in 1853, what amplification does the term provide,
given that the convergence was already required for every x in
the domain [x0, X ], and there are no further real inputs at which
one could impose additional conditions?
(3) The traditional reading of convergence, whether ordinary or
uniform, leaves no room for indices given by infinite numbers n
and n′ referred to by Cauchy (see Section 2.1).
(4) How can |rn| be smaller than every real ε > 0 if the option of
interpreting this inequality in terms of alternating quantifiers is
not available (see Section 2.2)?
(5) How can rn(x) evaluated at x =
1
n
produce the definite inte-
gral
∫
∞
1
sinx
x
dx when the answer should patently be dependent
on n (see Section 2.4)?
Before seeking to answer the questions posed in Section 3.1 (see
Section 5), we first address some methodological concerns and point
out possible pitfalls.
3.2. An ontological disclaimer. Before answering such questions,
one needs to clarify what kind of answer can be expected when dealing
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with the work of a mathematician with no access to modern conceptu-
alisations of mathematical entities like numbers and their set-theoretic
ontology prevalent today.
Such a historiographic concern is ubiquitous. Thus, what could a
modern historian mean, without falling into a trap of presentism, when
he asserts that Lagrange was the first to define the notion of the deriv-
ative f ′ of a real function f? Such an attribution is apparently prob-
lematic since Lagrange shared neither our set-theoretic ontology of a
punctiform continuum7 given by the set of real numbers, nor our no-
tion of a function as a relation of a certain type, again in a set-theoretic
context.
Some helpful insights in this area were provided by Benacerraf and
Quine, in terms of a dichotomy of mathematical procedures and practice
versus ontology of mathematical entities like numbers. Thus, Quine
wrote:
Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to number: there
is no saying absolutely what the numbers are; there is
only arithmetic. [Quine 1968, p. 198]
In a related development, [Benacerraf 1965] pointed out that if ob-
server E learned that the natural numbers “are” the Zermelo ordi-
nals ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, . . . , while observer J learned that they are the
von Neumann ordinals ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, . . . then, strictly speaking, they
are dealing with different things. Nevertheless, observer E’s actual
mathematical practice (and the mathematical structures and proce-
dures he may be interested in) is practically the same as observer J’s.
Hence, different ontologies may underwrite one and the same practice.
The distinction between practice and ontology can be seen as a par-
tial response to the challenge to the historians of science launched in
[Wartofsky 1976], as discussed in Section 1.2.
When dealing with Lagrange, Cauchy, or for that matter any math-
ematician before 1872, we need to keep in mind that their ontology
of mathematical entities like numbers is distinct from ours. However,
the procedures Lagrange uses can often be interpreted and clarified in
terms of their modern proxies, i.e., procedures used by modern math-
ematicians, as in the case of the concept of the derivative.
7Historians often use the term punctiform continuum to refer to a continuum made
out of points (as for example the traditional set-theoretic R). Earlier notions of
continuum are generally thought to be non-punctiform (i.e., not made out of points).
The term punctiform also has a technical meaning in topology unrelated to the
above distinction.
10 T. B., P. B., A. B., V. K., K. K., M. K., S. K., T. M., D. SC., AND D. SH.
The dichotomy of practice, procedures, and inferential moves, on the
one hand, versus foundational issues of ontology of mathematical en-
tities, on the other, is distinct from the familiar opposition between
intuition and rigor. In a mathematical framework rigorous up to mod-
ern standards, the syntactic procedures and inferential moves are just
as rigorous as the semantic foundational aspects, whether set-theoretic
or category-theoretic.8
3.3. Felix Klein on two tracks. In addition to an ontological dis-
claimer as in Section 3.2, one needs to bear in mind a point made
by Felix Klein in 1908, involving the non-uniqueness of a conceptual
framework for interpreting pre-1872 procedures.
Felix Klein described a rivalry of dual approaches in the following
terms. Having outlined the developments in real analysis associated
with Weierstrass and his followers, Klein pointed out that
The scientific mathematics of today is built upon the
series of developments which we have been outlining.
But an essentially different conception of infinitesimal
calculus has been running parallel with this [conception]
through the centuries [Klein 1908, p. 214].
Such a different conception, according to Klein,
harks back to old metaphysical speculations concerning
the structure of the continuum according to which this
was made up of [...] infinitely small parts (ibid.).
Klein went on to formulate a criterion,9 in terms of the mean value
theorem, for what would qualify as a successful theory of infinitesimals,
and concluded:
I will not say that progress in this direction is impossible,
but it is true that none of the investigators have achieved
anything positive [Klein 1908, p. 219].
Thus, the approach based on notions of infinitesimals is not limited to
“the work of Fermat, Newton, Leibniz and many others in the 17th and
8Nelson’s syntactic recasting of Robinson’s framework is a good illustration, in that
the logical procedures in Nelson’s framework are certainly up to modern standards
of rigor and are expressed in the classical Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC). With
respect to an enriched set-theoretic language, infinitesimals in Nelson’s Internal Set
Theory (IST) can be found within the real number system R itself. The seman-
tic/ontological issues are handled in an appendix to [Nelson 1977], showing Nelson’s
IST to be a conservative extension of ZFC.
9A similar criterion was formulated in [Fraenkel 1928, pp. 116–117]. For a discussion
of the Klein–Fraenkel criterion see [Kanovei, Katz & Mormann 2013, Section 6.1].
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18th centuries,” as implied by Victor J. Katz [KatzV 2014]. Rather, it
was very much a current research topic in Felix Klein’s mind.
Of course, Klein in 1908 had no idea at all of modern infinitesi-
mal frameworks, such as those of A. Robinson (see [Robinson 1961]),
Lawvere–Moerdijk–Reyes–Kock (see [Kock 2006]), or J. Bell [Bell 2006].
What Klein was referring to is the procedural issue of how analysis is
to be presented, rather than the ontological issue of a specific reali-
sation of an infinitesimal-enriched number system in the context of a
traditional set theory.
3.4. Track A and track B in Leibniz. The dichotomy mentioned by
Klein (see Section 3.3) can be reformulated in the terminology of dual
methodology as follows. One finds both A-track (i.e., Archimedean)
and B-track (Bernoullian, i.e., involving infinitesimals) methodologies
in historical authors like Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy. Note that scholars
attribute the first systematic use of infinitesimals as a foundational con-
cept to Johann Bernoulli. While Leibniz exploited both infinitesimal
methods and “exhaustion” methods usually interpreted in the context
of an Archimedean continuum, Bernoulli never wavered from the in-
finitesimal methodology. To note the fact of such systematic use by
Bernoulli is not to say that Bernoulli’s foundation is adequate, or that
it could distinguish between manipulations with infinitesimals that pro-
duce only true results and those manipulations that can produce false
results.
In addition to ratios of differentials like dy
dx
, Leibniz also considered
ratios of ordinary values which he denoted (d)y and (d)x, so that
the ratio (d)y
(d)x
would be what we call today the derivative. Here dx
and (d)x were distinct entities since Leibniz described them as respec-
tively inassignable and assignable in his text Cum Prodiisset [Leibniz 1701c]:
. . . although we may be content with the assignable quan-
tities (d)y, (d)v, (d)z, (d)x, etc., . . . yet it is plain
from what I have said that, at least in our minds, the
unassignables [inassignables in the original Latin] dx
and dy may be substituted for them by a method of
supposition even in the case when they are evanescent;
. . . (as translated in [Child 1920, p. 153]).
Echoes of Leibnizian terminology are found in Cauchy when he speaks
of assignable numbers while proving various convergence tests, see e.g.,
[Bradley & Sandifer 2009, pp. 37, 40, 87, 369]. An alternative term
used by Cauchy and others is a given quantity. [Fisher 1978] shares
the view that historical evaluations of mathematical analysis in general
12 T. B., P. B., A. B., V. K., K. K., M. K., S. K., T. M., D. SC., AND D. SH.
and Cauchy’s work in particular can profitably be made in the light of
both A-track and B-track approaches.
Leibniz repeatedly asserted that his infinitesimals, when compared
to 1, violate what is known today as the Archimedean property, viz.,
Euclid’s Elements, Definition V.4; see e.g., [Leibniz 1695b, p. 322], as
cited in [Bos 1974, p. 14].
4. From indivisibles to infinitesimals: reception
4.1. Indivisibles banned by the jesuits. Indivisibles and infinites-
imals were perceived as a theological threat and opposed on doctrinal
grounds in the 17th century. The opposition was spearheaded by clerics
and more specifically by the jesuits. Tracts opposing indivisibles were
composed by jesuits Paul Guldin, Mario Bettini, and Andre´ Tacquet
[Redondi 1987, p. 291]. P. Mancosu writes:
Guldin is taking Cavalieri to be composing the contin-
uum out of indivisibles, a position rejected by the Aris-
totelian orthodoxy as having atomistic implications. . . .
Against Cavalieri’s proposition that “all the lines” and
“all the planes” are magnitudes - they admit of ratios
- Guldin argues that “all the lines . . . of both figures
are infinite; but an infinite has no proportion or ratio to
another infinite.” [Mancosu 1996, p. 54]
Tacquet for his part declared that the method of indivisibles “makes
war upon geometry to such an extent, that if it is not to destroy it,
it must itself be destroyed.” [Festa 1992, p. 205], [Alexander 2014,
p. 119].
In 1632 (the year Galileo was summoned to stand trial over heliocen-
trism) the Society’s Revisors General led by Jacob Bidermann banned
teaching indivisibles in their colleges [Festa 1990], [Festa 1992, p. 198].
Indivisibles were placed on the Society’s list of permanently banned
doctrines in 1651 [Hellyer 1996]. The effects of anti-indivisible bans
were still felt in the 18th century, when most jesuit mathematicians
adhered to the methods of Euclidean geometry, to the exclusion of the
new infinitesimal methods:
. . . le grand nombre des mathe´maticiens de [l’Ordre] resta
jusqu’a` la fin du XVIIIe sie`cle profonde´ment attache´ aux
me´thodes euclidiennes. [Bosmans 1927, p. 77]
Echoes of such bans were still heard in the 19th century when jesuit
Moigno, who considered himself a student of Cauchy, wrote:
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In effect, either these magnitudes, smaller than any given
magnitude, still have substance and are divisible, or they
are simple and indivisible: in the first case their exis-
tence is a chimera, since, necessarily greater than their
half, their quarter, etc., they are not actually less than
any given magnitude; in the second hypothesis, they
are no longer mathematical magnitudes, but take on
this quality, this would renounce the idea of the con-
tinuum divisible to infinity, a necessary and fundamen-
tal point of departure of all the mathematical sciences
(ibid., xxiv f.) (as quoted in [Schubring 2005, p. 456])
(emphasis added)
Moigno saw a contradiction where there is none. Indeed, an infinitesi-
mal is smaller than any assignable, or given magnitude; and has been
so at least since Leibniz, as documented in Section 3.4. Thus, infinites-
imals need not be less than “their half, their quarter, etc.,” because
the latter are not assignable.
In fact, the dichotomy of Moigno’s critique is reminiscient of the
dichotomy of a critique of Galileo’s indivisibles penned by Moigno’s
fellow jesuit Orazio Grassi some three centuries earlier. P. Redondi
summarizes it as follows:
As for light - composed according to Galileo of indivis-
ible atoms, more mathematical than physical - in this
case, logical contradictions arise. Such indivisible atoms
must be finite or infinite. If they are finite, mathemati-
cal difficulties would arise. If they are infinite, one runs
into all the paradoxes of the separation to infinity which
had already caused Aristotle to discard the atomist the-
ory . . . [Redondi 1987, p. 196].
This criticism appeared in the first edition of Grassi’s book Ratio pon-
derum librae et simbellae, published in Paris in 1626. In fact, this
criticism of Grassi’s
exhumed a discounted argument, copied word-for-word
from almost any scholastic philosophy textbook. . . .
The Jesuit mathematician [Paul] Guldin, great oppo-
nent of the geometry of indivisibles, and an excellent
Roman friend of [Orazio] Grassi, must have dissuaded
him from repeating such obvious objections. Thus the
second edition of the Ratio, the Neapolitan edition of
1627, omitted as superfluous the whole section on indi-
visibles. [Redondi 1987, p. 197].
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Alas, unlike father Grassi, father Moigno had no Paul Guldin to dis-
suade him.
4.2. Unguru’s admonition. There are several approaches to uniform
convergence. These approaches are equivalent from the viewpoint of
modern mathematics (based on classical logic):
[A] the epsilon-delta approach in the A-track context;
[B] the approach involving a Bernoullian continuum;
[C] the sequential approach in the A-track context.
The approach usually found in textbooks is the approach [A] via the
epsilon-delta formulation involving quantifier alternations as detailed
in Section 6.5. The B-track approach is detailed in Section 5. An
alternative approach [C] via sequences runs as follows. A sequence
of functions rn as n runs through N converges uniformly to 0 on a
domain D if for each sequence of inputs xn in D, the sequence of
outputs rn(xn) tends to zero. Giusti pursues approaches [A] and [C]
to Cauchy respectively at [Giusti 1984, p. 38] and [Giusti 1984, p. 50]
(see Section 8). Meanwhile, S. Unguru admonished:
It is . . . a historically unforgiveable sin . . . to assume
wrongly that mathematical equivalence is tantamount
to historical equivalence. [Unguru 1976, p. 783]
When seeking a mathematical interpretation of a historical text we
must consider, in addition to questions of mathematical coherence,
also questions of coherence with the actual procedures adopted by the
historical author.
4.3. Bottazzini: What kept Cauchy from seeing? The points
made in Sections 3.2 through 3.4 about ontology vs procedures, as
well as multiple possibilities for modern interpretive frameworks, seem
straightforward enough. However, the consequences of paying insuffi-
cient attention to such distinctions can be grave. Thus, U. Bottazzini
opines that
the techniques that Abel used were those of Cauchy;
his definitions of continuity and of convergence are the
same, as are his use of infinitesimals in demonstrations.
It is precisely this latter fact that kept both men from
finding the weak point in Cauchy’s demonstration and
from seeing that there is another form of convergence,
what is today called the uniform convergence of a series
of functions. [Bottazzini 1986, pp. 115-116] (emphasis
in the original)
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Bottazzini’s claim that ‘it is precisely’ ‘the use of infinitesimals in
demonstrations’ that ‘kept [Cauchy] from finding . . . and from see-
ing, etc.’ only makes sense in the context of an interpretive paradigm
exclusively limited to track A (see Section 3.4). Such an approach
views the evolution of 19th century analysis as inevitable progress to-
ward the foundations of analysis purged of infinitesimals as established
by “the great triumvirate” [Boyer 1949, p. 298]) of Cantor, Dedekind,
and Weierstrass. In a similar vein, J. Dauben notes:
There is nothing in the language or thought of Leib-
niz, Euler, or Cauchy . . . that would make them early
Robinsonians. [Dauben 1988, p. 180]
“Early Robinsonians” perhaps not if this means familiarity with ultra-
filters,10 but the extent to which the procedures as found in Leibniz,
Euler, and Cauchy admit straightforward proxies in Robinson’s frame-
work does not emerge clearly from the above comment.
It seems almost as if, in an effort to save Cauchy as a herald for Weier-
strassian arithmetical analysis, some A-track enforcers need carefully
to purge the possibility that Cauchy might also be something quite dif-
ferent, something generally seen nowadays as contrary to the rational
structure of his iconage; e.g., their image seems to be that this other
was surely a remnant of the irrational in his methodology.
4.4. Fraser vs Laugwitz. In the abstract of his 1987 article in Histo-
ria Mathematica, Laugwitz is careful to note that he interprets Cauchy’s
sum theorem “with his [i.e., Cauchy’s] own concepts”:
It is shown that the famous so-called errors of Cauchy
are correct theorems when interpreted with his own con-
cepts. [Laugwitz 1987, p. 258]
In the same abstract, Laugwitz goes on to emphasize: “No assumptions
on uniformity or on nonstandard numbers are needed.” Indeed, in sec-
tion 7 on pages 264–266, Laugwitz gives a lucid discussion of the sum
theorem in terms of Cauchy’s infinitesimals, with not a whiff of modern
number systems. In particular this section does not mention the article
[Schmieden & Laugwitz 1958]. In a final section 15 entitled “Attempts
toward theories of infinitesimals,” Laugwitz presents a rather general
discussion, with no specific reference to the sum theorem, of how one
might formalize Cauchyan infinitesimals in modern set-theoretic terms.
A reference to [Schmieden & Laugwitz 1958] appears in this final sec-
tion only. Thus, Laugwitz carefully distinguishes between his analysis
of Cauchy’s procedures, on the one hand, and the ontological issues of
10For the role of these in a possible construction of the hyperreals see Section 5.2.
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possible implementations of infinitesimals in a set-theoretic context, on
the other.
Alas, all of Laugwitz’s precautions went for naught. In 2008, he
became a target of damaging innuendo in the updated version of The
Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Here C. Fraser writes as follows in
his article on Cauchy:
Laugwitz’s thesis is that certain of Cauchy’s results that
were criticized by later mathematicians are in fact valid
if one is willing to accept certain assumptions about
Cauchy’s understanding and use of infinitesimals. These
assumptions reflect a theory of analysis and infinitesi-
mals that was worked out by Laugwitz and Curt Schmieden
during the 1950s. [Fraser 2008, p. 76] (emphasis added)
What is particularly striking about Fraser’s misrepresentation of Laug-
witz’s scholarship is Fraser’s failure to recognize the dichotomy of pro-
cedure vs ontology. Fraser repeats the performance in 2015 when he
writes:
Laugwitz, . . . some two decades following the publi-
cation by Schmieden and him of the Ω-calculus com-
menced to publish a series of articles arguing that their
non-Archimedean formulation of analysis is well suited
to interpret Cauchy’s results on series and integrals.
[Fraser 2015, p. 27]
What Fraser fails to mention is that Laugwitz specifically separated his
analysis of Cauchy’s procedures from attempts to account ontologically
for Cauchy’s infinitesimals in modern terms.
4.5. The rhetoric of reaction. G. Schubring’s disagreement with
Laugwitz’s interpretation of Cauchy found expression in the following
comment:
[Giusti’s article] spurred Laugwitz to even more detailed
attempts to banish the error and confirm that Cauchy
had used hyper-real numbers. On this basis, he claims,
the errors vanish and the theorems become correct, or,
rather, they always were correct (see Laugwitz 1990, 21).
[Schubring 2005, p. 432] (emphasis added)
Here Schubring is referring to the article [Laugwitz 1990] though he is
most decidedly not quoting it. In fact, there is no mention of hyperreals
on page 21 in [Laugwitz 1990], contrary to Schubring’s claim. What
one does find here is the following comment:
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The “mistakes” show rather, as experimenta crucis that
one must understand Cauchy’s terms/definitions [Be-
griffe], in the spirit of the motto,11 in an infinitesimal-
mathematical sense. [Laugwitz 1990, p. 21] (translation
ours)
We fully endorse Laugwitz’s comment to the effect that Cauchy’s pro-
cedures must be understood in the sense of infinitesimal mathematics,
rather than paraphrased to fit the Epsilontik mode. Note that we are
dealing with an author, namely Laugwitz, who published Cauchy stud-
ies in the leading periodicals Historia Mathematica [Laugwitz 1987]
and Archive for History of Exact Sciences [Laugwitz 1989].12 The idea
that Laugwitz would countenance the claim that Cauchy “had used
hyper-real numbers” whereas both the term hyper-real and the relevant
construction were not introduced until [Hewitt 1948, p. 74], strikes us
as far-fetched. Meanwhile, in a colorful us-against-“them” passage,
J. Grabiner opines that
[Schubring] effectively rebuts the partisans of nonstan-
dard analysis who wish to make Cauchy one of them,
using the work of Cauchy’s disciple the Abbe´ Moigno
to argue for Cauchy’s own intentions. [Grabiner 2006,
p. 415]. (emphasis added)
Schubring indeed uses the work of Moigno in an apparent attempt to
refute infinitesimals. Jesuit Moigno’s confusion on the issue of infinites-
imals was detailed in Section 4.1.
Contrary to Schubring’s claim, Laugwitz did not attribute 20th cen-
tury number systems to Cauchy, but rather argued that modern (B-
track in the terminology of Section 3.4) infinitesimal frameworks pro-
vide better proxies for Cauchy’s procedures than modern Weierstrassian
(A-track in the terminology of Section 3.4) frameworks. Laugwitz also
sought to understand Cauchy’s inferential moves in terms of their mod-
ern proxies.
But Schubring’s insights don’t even reach a quarter of his student
K. Viertel’s, who writes:
11Here Laugwitz is referring to Cauchy’s motto to the effect that “Mon but principal
a e´te´ de concilier la rigueur, dont je m’e´tais fait une loi dans mon Cours d’analyse
avec la simplicite´ que produit la consideration directe des quantite´s infiniment pe-
tites.”
12The fact that Laugwitz had published articles in leading periodicals does not
mean that he couldn’t have said something wrong. However, it does suggest the
existence of a strawman aspect of Schubring’s sweeping claims against him.
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. . . one can find assertions of Cauchy that contradict
a consequent NSA-interpretation. With respect to the
function −m
x
and x−m and their continuity he remarks:
Both become infinite and, as a consequence, discontin-
uous when x = 0. (Bradley, Sandifer 2009, 28). . . . In
non-standard analysis, however, one has x−1 ≃ ∞ for
all x ≃ 0 which entails the continuity of the function 1
x
for the point zero. Thus Cauchy’s concept of continuity
is not always consistent (or is not always compatible)
with the concept of continuity of nonstandard analy-
sis. [Viertel 2014, Section 4.3.1.1, pp. 56-57] (transla-
tion ours)
Viertel’s apparent intuition that all infinite numbers x−1 are infinitely
close to each other makes one wonder how such intuitions could be
squared with Cauchy’s apparently distinct infinite integers n and n′
(see Sections 2.3 and 8.3). Viertel’s claims concerning the reciprocal
function in Robinson’s framework are of course incorrect.
Such crude mathematical errors are symptomatic of questionable pri-
ority scales. Viertel’s attempt to “prove” that the reciprocal function 1
x
is continuous at the origin in nonstandard analysis is doomed from the
start since the extension R →֒ ∗R preserves all the first-order prop-
erties under transfer.13 Anti-infinitesimal rhetoric by A-track scholars
appears to be reciprocal to mathematical competence in matters infin-
itesimal.
13The transfer principle is a type of theorem that, depending on the context, asserts
that rules, laws or procedures valid for a certain number system (or more general
mathematical structure), still apply (i.e., are transfered) to an extended number sys-
tem (or more general mathematical structure). Thus, the familiar extension Q →֒ R
preserves the properties of an ordered field. To give a negative example, the ex-
tension R →֒ R∪{±∞} of the real numbers to the so-called extended reals does
not preserve the properties of an ordered field. The hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R
preserves all first-order properties. For example, the identity sin2 x+cos2 x = 1 re-
mains valid for all hyperreal x, including infinitesimal and infinite values of x ∈ ∗R.
In particular, the properties of the reciprocal function remain the same after it is
extended to the hyperreal domain.
Arsac tries to explain nonstandard analysis but he seems to be as unaware of the
transfer principle as Viertel: “Une fonction continue au sens habituel est une fonc-
tion continue aux points standards, mais elle ne l’est pas obligatoirement aux points
non standard.” [Arsac 2013, p. 133] Contrary to his claim, the natural extension
of a continuous function f will be continuous at all hyperreal points c in the sense
of the standard definition ∀ǫ > 0 ∃δ > 0: |x− c| < δ =⇒ |f(x)− f(c)| < ǫ, by the
transfer principle. Indeed, Arsac confused S-continuity and continuity. . .
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4.6. Gestalt switch. The debate over Cauchy’s understanding of in-
finitesimals bears some of the marks of a paradigm shift in the sense
of Thomas Kuhn. A change is taking place in the historiography of
mathematics, involving the entry of professional mathematicians into
the field. Mathematicians bring with them the understanding that the
same mathematical object or structure can be defined and described in
a variety of mathematical languages. Similarly, the same theorem can
be proved (or the same theory developed) in a multitude of languages
and conceptual frameworks.
When a mathematician of the past used (and in some cases, invented)
several distinct mathematical languages (as was the case for Cauchy), it
is natural for a modern mathematician to exploit modern formalisations
of these languages in the analysis of his predecessor’s work. This adds
depth and added dimension to our vision of the past, amounting to a
gestalt switch as formulated in [Kuhn 1996, pp. 150–151]:
[T]he transition between competing paradigms cannot be
made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral expe-
rience. Like a gestalt switch, it must occur all at once
(though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all. How,
then, are scientists brought to make this transition? Part
of the answer is that they are very often not. Coper-
nicanism made few converts for almost a century after
Copernicus’ death. Newton’s work was not generally ac-
cepted, particularly on the Continent, for more than half
a century after the Principia appeared. Priestley never
accepted the oxygen theory, nor Lord Kelvin the electro-
magnetic theory, and so on. The difficulties of conversion
have often been noted by scientists themselves. . . . Max
Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific Auto-
biography, sadly remarked that “a new scientific truth
does not triumph by convincing its opponents and mak-
ing them see the light, but rather because its opponents
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it.”
Here Kuhn is quoting [Planck 1950, pp. 33–34]. In short, science (in-
cluding its historiography) makes progress one funeral at a time.
5. Interpreting Cauchy’s infinitesimal mathematics
Cutland et al. agree with Grattan-Guinness (see Section 7.1) con-
cerning the difficulty of interpreting Cauchy’s procedures in an Archi-
medean framework:
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[Cauchy’s] modification of his theorem is anything but
clear if we interpret his conception of the continuum as
identical with the ‘Weierstrassian’ concept. Abraham
Robinson [1966] first discusses Cauchy’s original ‘theo-
rem’ . . . [Cutland et al. 1988, p. 376]
5.1. Robinson’s reading. The first B-track interpretation of Cauchy’s
sum theorem was developed in [Robinson 1966, pp. 271–273].
Modern versions of the sum theorem require an additional hypothesis
to obtain a mathematically correct result, either (i) in terms of uniform
convergence, or (ii) in terms of equicontinuity of the family of functions.
Robinson considers both possibilities in the context of Cauchy’s 1821
formulation of the sum theorem, which is sufficiently ambiguous to ac-
comodate various readings. The last mention of the term equicontinu-
ous occurs in [Robinson 1966] on page 272, line 10 from bottom.
Meanwhile, starting on page 272, line 2 from bottom, Robinson turns
to an analysis of Cauchy’s 1853 formulation of the sum theorem and its
proof. Robinson writes: “Over thirty years after the publication of [the
sum theorem], Cauchy returned to the problem [in] (Cauchy [1853]).”
(ibid.) Robinson concludes:
If we interpret this theorem in the sense of Non-standard
Analysis, so that ‘infiniment petite’ is taken to mean
‘infinitesimal’ and translate ‘toujours’ by ‘for all x’ (and
not only ‘for all standard x′), then the condition intro-
duced by Cauchy . . . amounts precisely to uniform con-
vergence in accordance with (i) above.” [Robinson 1966,
p. 273]
Thus, in his analysis of Cauchy’s 1853 article, Robinson only envisions
the possibility (i) of uniform convergence. The reason is that Cauchy’s
proof contains hints pointing toward such an interpretation, while it
contains no hints in the direction of (ii) equicontinuity.
Robinson’s interpretation is based on a characterisation of uniform
convergence exploiting a hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R; cf. [Davis 1977,
p. 62, Theorem 6.3]. Down-to-earth treatments of the hypereals can be
found e.g., in [Lindstrøm 1988] and [Prestel 1990]; see Section 5.2.
Robinson wrote:
Theorem 4.6.1 The sequence of standard functions
{fn(x)} converges to the standard function f(x) uni-
formly on B ⊂ T [where T is a metric space] if and
only if f(p) ≈ fn(p) for all p ∈
∗B and for all infinite n.
[Robinson 1966, p. 116]
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Here the relation of infinite proximity fn(x) ≈ f(x) signifies that the
difference fn(x)− f(x) is infinitesimal.
5.2. Constructing a hyperreal field. We outline a construction of a
hyperreal field ∗R. Let RN denote the ring of sequences of real numbers,
with arithmetic operations defined termwise. Then we have
∗R = RN/MAX
where MAX is the maximal ideal consisting of all “negligible” se-
quences (un), i.e., sequences which vanish for a set of indices of full
measure ξ, namely, ξ
(
{n ∈ N : un = 0}
)
= 1.
Here ξ : P(N) → {0, 1} (thus ξ takes only two values, 0 and 1) is
a finitely additive measure taking the value 1 on each cofinite set,
where P(N) is the set of subsets of N.
The subset Fξ ⊆ P(N) consisting of sets of full measure is called a
free ultrafilter. These originate with [Tarski 1930]. The construction
of a Bernoullian continuum outlined here was therefore not available
prior to that date. Further details on the hyperreals can be found in
[Fletcher et al. 2017]. The educational advantages of the infinitesimal
approach are discussed in [Katz & Polev 2017].
5.3. An example. To illustrate the mathematical issue involved, we
let B = [0, 1] and consider the sequence of real functions fn(x) =
(1− x)n on the interval B. Then the limiting function
f(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 if x > 0
is discontinuous. The condition that f(x) ≈ fn(x) for an infinite n is
satisfied at all real inputs x, but fails at the infinitesimal input x = 1
n
since fn(
1
n
) = (1− 1
n
)n ≈ 1
e
and 1
e
is appreciable: 1
e
6≈ 0. The limit of the
sequence can of course be re-written as the sum of a series, producing
a series of continuous real functions with discontinuous sum.
A similar phenomenon can be illustrated by means of the family
fn(x) = arctannx.
5.4. Cauchy’s B-track procedures. We will now interpret Cauchy’s
procedures (as opposed to ontology ; see Section 3.2) in such a frame-
work. The functions fn in Robinson’s Theorem 4.6.1 correspond to
Cauchy’s partial sums sn. Our main thesis, in line with the comment
by Grattan-Guinness cited in Section 6.2, is the following.
Main Thesis. Cauchy’s term toujours suggests extend-
ing the possible inputs to the function.
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We interpret this extension procedure in terms of the following hyper-
real proxy. We extend the domain B of a real function f : B → R to
its hyperreal extension ∗B, obtaining a hyperreal function f : ∗B → ∗R.
Thus, if B is Cauchy’s interval [x0, X ] with, say, x0 = 0 (as in the
example of the series (4) in Section 2.3), then the hyperreal exten-
sion ∗B = ∗[0, X ] will contain in particular positive infinitesimals of the
form α = 1
n
where n is an infinite hyperinteger.
The condition fn(x) ≈ f(x) is equivalent to the remainder term
rn = f(x) − fn(x) being infinitesimal. This is required to hold at
all hyperreal inputs x, serving as a proxy for Cauchy’s 1853 modified
hypothesis with its implied extension of the domain.
Note that Robinson’s Theorem 4.6.1 cited in Section 5.1 contains no
quantifier alternations. This characterisation of uniform convergence
closely parallels the condition found in Cauchy’s text.
The condition |rn| < ε for all real positive ε amounts to requiring rn
(more precisely, rn(x)) to be infinitesimal, as per item [B] in Section 2.2.
As Cauchy pointed out, the condition is not satisfied by the series
sin x+ 1
2
sin 2x+ 1
3
sin 3x+ . . .
In the hyperreal framework, the quantity rn(
1
n
) for all infinite n will
possess nonzero standard part (shadow) given precisely by the inte-
gral
∫
∞
1
sinx
x
dx, in line with Cauchy’s comment cited in Section 2.4 (a
more detailed discussion can be found in [Cleave 1971]). This answers
all the queries formulated in Section 3.1.
5.5. An issue of adequacy and refinement. Bottazzini opines that
the language of infinites and infinitesimals that Cauchy
used here seemed ever more inadequate to treat the so-
phisticated and complex questions then being posed by
analysis. . . The problems posed by the study of nature,
such as those Fourier had faced, now reappeared every-
where in the most delicate questions of “pure” analysis
and necessarily led to the elaboration of techniques of
inquiry considerably more refined than those that had
served French mathematicians at the beginning of the
century. Infinitesimals were to disappear from mathe-
matical practice in the face of Weierstrass’ ε and δ no-
tation, . . . [Bottazzini 1986, p. 208]. (emphasis added)
Are infinitesimal techniques “inadequate,” or less “refined” than ep-
silontic ones, as Bottazzini appears to suggest? We have argued that,
procedurally speaking, the infinitesimal techniques of the classical mas-
ters ranging from Leibniz to Euler to Cauchy are more robust than is
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generally recognized by historians whose training is limited to a Weier-
strassian framework.
6. Grabiner’s reading
In this section we will analyze the comments by J. Grabiner related
to Cauchy’s alleged confusion in the context of the sum theorem. Two
subtle mathematical distinctions emerged in the middle of the 19th
century: (i) continuity vs uniform continuity, and (ii) convergence vs
uniform convergence. We will show that Grabiner herself is confused
about whether Cauchy’s purported error consisted in his failure to dis-
tinguish continuity from uniform continuity, or his failure to distinguish
convergence from uniform convergence.
6.1. Whose confusion? Grabiner alleges that Cauchy’s 1821 theo-
rem failed to distinguish pointwise from uniform convergence, and as
a result he left his sum theorem open to some obvious counterexam-
ples. Grabiner presents her case for Cauchy’s alleged “confusion” in
the following terms:
. . . in treating series of functions, Cauchy did not distin-
guish between pointwise and uniform convergence. The
verbal formulations like “for all” that are involved in
choosing deltas did not distinguish between “for any ep-
silon and for all x” and “for any x, given any epsilon”
[19]. Nor was it at all clear in the 1820’s how much de-
pended on this distinction, since proofs about continuity
and convergence were in themselves so novel. We shall
see the same confusion between uniform and point-wise
convergence as we turn now to Cauchy’s theory of the
derivative. [Grabiner 1983a, p. 191] (emphasis added)
Here the bracketed number [19] refers to her footnote 19 that reads as
follows:
19. I. Grattan-Guinness, Development of the Founda-
tions of Mathematical Analysis from Euler to Riemann,
M. I. T. Press, Cambridge and London, 1970, p. 123,
puts it well: “Uniform convergence was tucked away in
the word ‘always,’ with no reference to the variable at
all.” [Grabiner 1983a, p. 194]
The views of Grattan-Guinness will be examined in Section 7. We now
summarize Grabiner’s position as follows:
G1. Cauchy did not distinguish between pointwise convergence and
uniform convergence.
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G2. Cauchy did not distinguish between “for any epsilon and for
all x” and “for any x, given any epsilon.”
G3. The failure to distinguish between the quantified clauses in
item (2) is indicative of a “confusion between uniform and point-
wise convergence” in Cauchy’s procedures.
G4. Cauchy’s term always is somehow related to uniform conver-
gence.
G5. Cauchy’s use of the term always made no reference to the vari-
able of the function.
G6. No mention of infinitesimals whatsoever is made by Grabiner
in connection with Cauchy’s treatment of the sum theorem.
6.2. Quantifier order. What does Cauchy’s mysterious term always
signify? A reader sufficiently curious about it to trace the sources will
discover that Grattan-Guinness (as cited by Grabiner) is not referring
to the 1821 Cours d’Analyse, but rather to the article [Cauchy 1853],
where Cauchy
stated a new theorem which embodied the extension of
the necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence,
and a revised theorem 4.4 to cover uniform convergence
. . . [Grattan-Guinness 1970, p. 122]. (emphasis added)
We will get back to Cauchy’s always in due time. We can now ana-
lyze Grabiner’s claims G1, G2, and G3 as stated in Section 6.1. Her
claim G1 is directly contradicted by Grattan-Guinness in the passage
just cited. Here it turns out that in 1853 Cauchy did modify the original
1821 condition by extending it.
Grabiner’s claim G2 involves terms “for any”, “for all”, and “given
any”, each of which expresses the universal quantifier. Thus claim G2
postulates a distinction between a pair of quantifier clauses, namely,
(∀x)(∀ǫ) and (∀ǫ)(∀x). However, these two clauses are logically equiv-
alent. Indeed, the order of the quantifiers is significant only when
one has alternating existential and universal quantifiers, contrary to
her claim G2. Quantifier alternation is irrelevant when only universal
quantifiers are involved.
Grabiner’s claim G3 postulates a “confusion” on Cauchy’s part but is
based on incorrect premises, and is therefore similarly incorrect. Gra-
biner’s indictment of Cauchy in [Grabiner 1983a, p. 191] does not stand
up to scrutiny, at least if we are to believe her source, namely Grattan-
Guinness. Since her claims G5 and G6 are based on Grattan-Guinness,
we will postpone their analysis until Section 7.
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6.3. What does it take to elucidate a distinction? Turning now
to Grabiner’s 1981 book, we find the following:
The elucidation of the difference between convergence
and uniform convergence by men like Stokes, Weier-
strass, and Cauchy himself was still more than a decade
away. [Grabiner 1981, p. 12]
Apparently Cauchy did provide an “elucidation of the difference be-
tween convergence and uniform convergence,” after all. The passage
immediately following is particularly revealing:
The verbal formulations of limits and continuity used by
Cauchy and Bolzano obscured the distinction between
“for any epsilon, there is a delta that works for all x”
and “for any epsilon and for all x, there is a delta.” The
only tools for handling such distinctions were words, and
the usual formulation with the word “always” suggested
“for all x” as well as “for any epsilon.” (ibid., pp. 12–13)
(emphasis added)
This passage immediately follows the passage on p. 12 on uniform con-
vergence, but it appears to deal instead with uniform continuity. In-
deed, the quantifier clause ∀ǫ∃δ∀x that Grabiner refers to customarily
appears in the definition of uniform continuity of a function rather than
uniform convergence of a series of functions.14 Grabiner’s position as
expressed in the 1981 book involves the following claims (cf. those of
her 1983 article enumerated in Section 6.1):
G7. More than a decade later, Cauchy elucidated the difference be-
tween convergence and uniform convergence;
G8. To handle the distinction between continuity and uniform conti-
nuity, Cauchy needed to handle the quantifier-order distinction
between ∀ǫ∃δ∀x, on the one hand, and ∀ǫ∀x∃δ, on the other.
G9. Cauchy only had the term always at his disposal.
We will analyze these in Section 6.5.
6.4. Cauchy’s definition of continuity. Having mentioned both con-
tinuity and convergence in Section 6.3, we should point out that, while
Cauchy’s definition of continuity in 1821 was ambiguous to the extent
that it is not clear whether he was defining ordinary or uniform con-
tinuity, what is clear is that he exploited the term toujours to refer
to the possible inputs to the function. He formulated the definition as
follows in 1853:
14The symbol δ is not used in reference to an integer tending to infinity.
26 T. B., P. B., A. B., V. K., K. K., M. K., S. K., T. M., D. SC., AND D. SH.
. . . une fonction u de la variable re´elle x sera continue,
entre deux limites donne´es de x, si, cette fonction admet-
tant pour chaque valeur interme´diaire de x une valeur
unique et finie, un accroissement infiniment petit at-
tribue´ a` la variable produit toujours, entre les limites
dont il s’agit, un accroissement infiniment petit de la
fonction elle-meˆme. [Cauchy 1853, pp. 455–456] (em-
phasis on continue in the original; emphasis on toujours
ours)
The phrase “toujours, entre les limites dont il s’agit” suggests that
the term toujours refers to the possible inputs to the function. While
Cauchy apparently did not distinguish between distinct notions of con-
tinuity (such as modern notions of pointwise continuity as opposed to
uniform continuity), he did use the term toujours in reference to the
possible inputs.
One can surmise that when he uses the term toujours in the definition
of convergence in the same article, he is also referring to the possible
inputs.
Cauchy’s definition of convergence in 1821 cited in Section 1.1 did
not use the term toujours. Thus Cauchy was possibly referring to
ordinary convergence. By contrast, in 1853 the definition did use the
term toujours in defining convergence, which arguably corresponds to
uniform convergence (see Section 5 for a more detailed discussion).
6.5. Uniform convergence today. To fix notation, recall that today
a series
∑
∞
n=0 un(x) is said to converge uniformly to a function s(x) on
a domain I if
(∀ǫ > 0)(∃N ∈ N)(∀x ∈ I)(∀m ∈ N)
[
(m > N)⇒
∣∣∣∣∣s(x)−
m∑
n=0
un
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
]
where all variables and functions are real. Grabiner’s claim G8 to
the effect that Cauchy failed to distinguish ∀ǫ∃δ∀x from ∀ǫ∀x∃δ (see
Section 6.3 above) is puzzling coming as it does in the midst of a
discussion of the dichotomy of convergence vs uniform convergence
of series of functions, rather than continuity vs uniform continuity.
Furthermore, we are not familiar with any text where Cauchy dealt
explicitly with a distinction related to continuity vs uniform continuity.
In fact, Grabiner herself writes:
Weierstrass and his school distinguished–as Cauchy had
not–between pointwise and uniform continuity.
[Grabiner 1981, p. 97]
CAUCHY’S INFINITESIMALS AND HIS SUM THEOREM 27
We will therefore assume that what Grabiner meant on page 13 of her
book was actually the following modification of her claim G8:
G8′. To handle the distinction between convergence and uniform
convergence, Cauchy needed to handle the quantifier-order dis-
tinction between ∀ǫ∃N∀x, on the one hand, and ∀ǫ∀x∃N , on
the other.
By page 140 Grabiner seems to have changed her mind once again
about the status of convergence in Cauchy, as she writes:
Actually, [Cauchy’s] proof implicitly assumed the func-
tion to be uniformly continuous, though he did not dis-
tinguish between continuity and uniform continuity, just
as he had not distinguished between convergence and
uniform convergence. [Grabiner 1981, p. 140] (empha-
sis added)
We will assume that she is referring to [Cauchy 1821] here rather than
[Cauchy 1853]. Grabiner does not explain Cauchy’s use of the term
always, but she assumes in claims G7–G9 that the use of this term
somehow corresponds to requiring the stronger uniform convergence.
She also assumes in G8′ that successfully dealing with the dichotomy
of convergence vs uniform convergence necessarily requires a quantifier-
order distinction, indicative of an A-track parti pris.
6.6. A-tracking Cauchy’s infinitesimals. Grabiner wrote in 1983:
Now we come to the last stage in our chronological
list: definition. In 1823, Cauchy defined the derivative
of f(x) as the limit, when it exists, of the quotient of
differences f(x+h)−f(x)
h
as h goes to zero [4, pp. 22–23].
[Grabiner 1983b, p. 204]
Her reference “4, pp. 22–23” is to [Cauchy 1823]. Here is Cauchy’s
definition that Grabiner claims to report on:
Lorsque la fonction y = f(x) reste continue entre deux
limites donne´es de la variable x, et que l’on assigne a`
cette variable une valeur comprise entre les deux limites
dont il s’agit, un accroissement infiniment petit, attribue´
a` la variable, produit un accroissement infiniment petit
de la fonction elle-meˆme. Par conse´quent, si l’on pose
alors ∆x = i, les deux termes du rapport aux diffe´rences
∆y
∆x
=
f(x+ i)− f(x)
i
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seront des quantite´s infiniment petites. [Cauchy 1823]
(emphasis added)
Notice that the infinitely small have been mentioned three times. Cauchy
continues:
Mais, tandis que ces deux termes s’approcheront inde´fini-
ment et simultane´ment de la limite ze´ro, le rapport lui-
meˆme pourra converger vers une autre limite, soit posi-
tive, soit ne´gative. Cette limite, lorsqu’elle existe, a une
valeur de´termine´e, pour chaque valeur particulie`re de x
. . . on donne a` la nouvelle fonction le nom de fonction
de´rive´e, . . . (ibid)
Grabiner’s paraphrase of Cauchy’s definition is a blatant example of
failing to see what is right before one’s eyes; for Cauchy’s infinitely
small i have been systematically purged by Grabiner, only to be re-
placed by a post-Weierstrassian imposter “as h goes to zero.” The
difference between the Cauchyan and Weierstrassian notions of limit
wsa recently analyzed in [Nakane 2014].
7. Interpretation by Grattan-Guinness
As we saw in Section 6, Grabiner restricts her discussion of the sum
theorem to mentioning that in 1853, Cauchy introduced uniform con-
vergence (which is a sufficient condition for the validity of the sum
theorem as stated today). Grattan-Guinness treats the sum theorem
in more detail. He notes that
Cauchy lived through the appearance of modes of con-
vergence and returned to his [sum theorem] in a short
paper of 1853. . . [Cauchy] admitted that
π − x
2
= sin x+
1
2
sin 2x+
1
3
sin 3x+ · · ·
. . . was a counterexample with its discontinuity of
magnitude π when x equals a multiple of π.
[Grattan-Guinness 1970, p. 122].
7.1. Difficult to interpret. Recall that Cauchy denotes by sn(x)
the nth partial sum of the series s(x) = u0(x) + u1(x) + . . . . He
also denotes by rn(x) = s(x) − sn(x) the nth remainder of the series.
Grattan-Guinness writes:
So a repair was needed, precisely at the point in his
original proof of [the sum theorem] where he had said
that [rn(x0 + α) − rn(x0)] “becomes insensible at the
same time” as rn(x0). (ibid.)
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Here an understanding of the term rn(x0 + α) is crucial to interpret-
ing Cauchy’s proof, and we will return to it in Section 7.2. Grattan-
Guinness proceeds to make the following key comment:
This remark [of Cauchy’s] is difficult to interpret against
[i.e., in the context of] the classification of modes of uni-
form convergence given here . . . since α is an infinitesi-
mally small increment of x. (ibid.) (emphasis added)
The “modes of convergence” he is referring to here appear in his book
[Grattan-Guinness 1970, pp. 119–120] (rather than in Cauchy’s arti-
cle). They are all formulated in terms of quantifier alternations, while
the variable x ranges through the real domain of the function. Grattan-
Guinness then paraphrases the revised version of Cauchy’s theorem
from [Cauchy 1853, p. 33], asserts that the proof is based on “the
combined smallness of rn(x0) and rn(x0+α)” [Grattan-Guinness 1970,
p. 123] among other ingredients, and concludes that “uniform conver-
gence itself was tucked away in the word ‘always’ with no reference to
the variable at all.” (ibid.) We summarize his position as follows:
GG1. Cauchy exploits infinitesimals in his attempted proof of the sum
theorem.
GG2. More specifically, Cauchy evaluates the remainder term rn at
an input x0 + α where α is an infinitesimal.
GG3. Cauchy’s proof is based on the smallness of rn(x0 + α).
GG4. The procedures in [Cauchy 1821] and [Cauchy 1853] involve no
quantifier alternations.15
GG5. Cauchy’s arguments relying on infinitesimals are difficult to in-
terpret in the context of the traditional characterisations of uni-
form convergence which rely on quantifier alternations.
GG6. Cauchy’s term always alludes to uniform convergence.
GG7. Cauchy’s term always makes no reference to the variable x.
7.2. Shortcomings. The analysis of Cauchy’s procedures by Grattan-
Guinness contains three shortcomings. First, claim GG3 concerning the
expression rn(x0 + α) does not mention the crucial relation
α =
1
n
15Grattan-Guinness acknowledges this point GG4 implicitly in his summary of
Cauchy’s proof in [Grattan-Guinness 1970, p. 123]. Meanwhile, an ε does occur
in Cauchy on p. 32; see Section 2.2.
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between n and the infinitesimal. This relation is crucial to Cauchy’s
analysis of series (2) namely sin x+ 1
2
sin 2x+ 1
3
sin 3x+ . . . already dis-
cussed in Section 2.3. In fact in 1853 Cauchy did not use the symbol α
at all but worked directly with the infinitesimal 1
n
.
As far as claim GG6 is concerned, Grattan-Guinness makes no at-
tempt to explain the relation between uniform convergence and the
term always exploited in the formulation of Cauchy’s theorem.
Finally, his claim GG7 is misleading. The term always is indeed
meant to refer to the variable x (as it did in Cauchy’s definition of
continuity; see Section 6.4). Neither Grabiner nor Grattan-Guinness
properly address this point. But in order to explain precisely in what
way the term refers to x, one needs to abandon the limitations of the
particular interpretive paradigm they are both laboring under, and
avail oneself of a modern framework where Cauchy’s procedures are
not “difficult to interpret”; see Section 3.
8. Giusti on the meaning of toujours
E. Giusti proposed two different interpretations of Cauchy’s sum
theorem, which we explore in Sections 8.1 and 8.2.
8.1. Giusti’s epsilontic track. In a 1984 study of Cauchy’s sum the-
orem, E. Giusti wrote:
The comparison between the statement and the proof
clarifies immediately the meaning of the word “toujours”
in this context. The sentence: “the sum (3)16 always
becomes infinitesimal for infinite n and n′ > n” turns
out to mean nothing but that “it is possible to assign
to n a value sufficiently large so that it follows that |sn′−
sn| < ε for every n
′ > n and every x”; [Giusti 1984,
p. 38] (emphasis added)
Giusti’s comment indeed “clarifies immediately the meaning” of the
sum theorem but only in the sense of providing a mathematically cor-
rect result loosely corresponding to Cauchy’s theorem. Giusti contin-
ues:
in other words, it indicates the uniform convergence of
the series. As support for this, Cauchy shows how in
the case of Abel’s series the condition is not satisfied,
and the sum (3) does not become infinitely small for
16This is a reference to Cauchy’s sum (3) namely un + un+1 . . . un′−1 discussed in
Section 2.
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infinitely large values of n and n′. (ibid.) (emphasis in
the original; translation ours)
To summarize, Giusti’s formulation relies on thinly veiled quantifier
alternations, requires interpreting what Cauchy calls an “infinite num-
ber n” as a variable subordinate to a universal quantifier, and sheds
little light on Cauchy’s term always. Cauchy’s own procedures are
therefore not fully clarified.
8.2. Giusti’s sequential track. A few pages later, Giusti offers an
alternative interpretation in the following terms:
[In Cauchy’s sum theorem] the magnitude which plays
a crucial role is the remainder term rn(x), depending
on two variables. The convergence of that series implies
that rn(x) always tends to 0 for infinite values of x [sic],
which means, from the standpoint of our interpretation,
that for each sequence xn the variable rn(xn) is infinites-
imal. Once again, this [procedure] is equivalent to [prov-
ing] uniform convergence. . . . [In Cauchy’s analysis of
the series of Abel], as we have already explained, Cauchy
proves that if the sum un + un+1 + . . .+ un′−1 becomes
always infinitely small for some infinitely big values of n
and n′, then the series u1 + u2 + u3 + . . . converges and
its sum is a continuous function. [Giusti 1984, p. 50]
[translation ours]
Thus, Giusti provides a sequential interpretation of Cauchy’s argument,
still in an Archimedean context (see Section 4.2, item [C]). However,
as Laugwitz pointed out,
Giusti gives a correct translation of the example into the
language of sequences, . . . [Giusti 1984, 50]. But he fails
to translate the general theorem and its proof. Actually
both x (or x+ α) and n will have to be replaced by se-
quences which becomes troublesome as soon as they are
not connected as in the example where x = 1/n. More-
over, the theorem shows the power of Cauchy’s “direct
consideration of infinitesimals.” [Laugwitz 1987, p. 266]
A paraphrase of Cauchy’s proof along the lines of Giusti’s sequential
reading may be harder to implement than the analysis of Abel’s ex-
ample, and may depart significantly from Cauchy’s own proof as sum-
marized in [Grattan-Guinness 1970, formula (6.30), p. 123], which we
present in Section 8.4. An additional difficulty (with Giusti’s [C]-track
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reading; see Section 4.2) not mentioned by Laugwitz is detailed in Sec-
tion 8.3.
8.3. Order n′ > n. If n and n′ are (infinite) numbers then one nat-
urally expects as Cauchy does that they are comparable; as Cauchy
writes, we have n′ > n. However if they are sequences n = (nk)
and n′ = (n′k) tending to infinity, then there is no reason to assume that
they are comparable. For example, if nk = k whereas n
′
k = k + (−1)
k
then who is to say which sequence is bigger, n′ or n? Meanwhile in
any ordered Bernoullian continuum (see Section 3.4) comparability of
numbers is automatic. This is not to say that Cauchy constructed an
ordered Bernoullian continuum, but rather that his procedures presume
that the infinite numbers are ordered, and this idea finds more faith-
ful proxies in modern infinitesimal theories than in Giusti’s [C]-track
reading.
8.4. Cauchy’s track. To show that s(x0 +α)− s(x0) is infinitesimal,
Cauchy writes rn = s− sn, so that
s(x0 + α)− s(x0) =
[
sn(x0 + α)− sn(x0)
]
+
[
rn(x0 + α)− rn(x0)
]
(see Section 5.4). The terms rn(x0 + α) and rn(x0) are infinitesimal
for each infinite n by Cauchy’s always hypothesis. To account for
the smallness of the first summand, Grattan-Guinness appeals to the
“continuity of sn(x).” However, this is immediate only for finite n,
whereas Cauchy’s proof of continuity requires ∆sn = sn(x0+α)−sn(x0)
to be infinitesimal for some infinite n.
Can one guarantee that if ∆sn is infinitesimal for each finite n, this
property will persist for some infinite n? In the context of hyper-
real proxies for Cauchy’s procedures, the answer is affirmative (ev-
ery internal sequence which is infinitesimal for all finite n will re-
main infinitesimal for some infinite n). What is perhaps even more
remarkable than the validity of this type of permanence principle is
the fact that a related principle can indeed be found in [Cauchy 1829],
as reported in [Robinson 1966, p. 274]. The relevant technical result
in a hyperreal framework is [Robinson 1966, Theorem 3.3.20, p. 65].
[McKinzie & Tuckey 1997, p. 49] follow [Laugwitz 1990] in interpreting
Euler in terms of hidden lemmas using a related result called the over-
spill theorem; see also the sequential theorem in [McKinzie & Tuckey 2001,
p. 361].
9. Conclusion
Interpretation of texts written in the nineteenth century, and the
meaning we give to technical terms, procedures, theories, and the like
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are closely related to what we already know as well as our expectations
and assumptions. This paper provides evidence that a change in the
cultural-technical framework of a historian provides new explanations,
which are arguably more natural, and new insights into Cauchy’s work.
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